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Tax Levels, Structures, and Reforms:
Convergence or Persistence
Neil Brooks*and Thaddeus Hwong**
One of the central issues in comparative law and political economy
is whether the forces of globalization will result in the convergence
of public policies across countries. Noting in particular that taxes
collected still cover a considerable range across industrialized
countries -from a low of 20% of GDP to a high of 50% - some have
argued that globalization has not resultedin a loss of tax sovereignty.
However following a review ofthe evidence, in this Article we conclude
that globalization has had significant but subtle effects on tax levels
and structures. Moreover these pressures will make it increasingly
dfficult for countries to raise revenue to finance new public needs
and to structure their tax systems in order to achieve a more socially
acceptable distributionof income than what marketforces dictate. Tax
levels in most countries have remained essentiallyflat over the past
twenty years, but there is a host of reasonsfor thinking they would
have continued to rise were it not for the pressures of globalization.
Statutory corporatetax rates have declined dramaticallyand,although
corporate tax revenues have remained robust, this has been due to
factors unrelated to deliberate tax policy choices. Personalmarginal
tax rates have also declined sharply and tax revenues have been
increasingly raised by regressive consumption taxes. These trends
stem from tax competition brought on by the forces of globalization,
not from changing ideas or other political variables. In this Article
we conclude that in order to prevent tax competition from completely
eroding the ability of countries to fashion their own tax systems, there
will have to be considerable cooperation among the major countries
and some harmonization of aspects of their tax systems, particularly
as they apply to footloose factors ofproduction.
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THE CRISIS OF THE MODERN TAX STATE

Over the past thirty years the world has become increasingly globalized.
Although the term globalization has been used to describe a range of
economic, political, social, ideological, cultural and technological changes
that have caused the countries of the world to become much more closely
knitted, in economic terms three connected developments have greatly
intensified over the past few decades and have become the defining hallmarks
of the contemporary international economy: (1) the liberalization of markets
and the globalization of trade, (2) the dramatic increase in long-term foreign
direct investment and the globalization of production, and (3) the increase in
the mobility of financial capital and the globalization of capital and financial
markets. These trends have heightened national competition over financial
capital, the location of business, high-skilled labor, and ways of reducing
the costs of production.
In light of these changes in the global economic environment, one of
the most pressing issues in the study of comparative law and political
economy has become the extent to which countries are still able to legislate
autonomously to further the social goals of their citizens while achieving
acceptable levels of economic growth. Many commentators argue that the
powerful set of social and economic forces accompanying globalization are
requiring countries to converge towards one singular governing model- the
neo-liberal model - in which private ordering processes, such as markets,
civil society, and the family, are the dominant forms of social organization.
These exponents of convergence argue that the environmental forces that
have led to increased economic integration limit the ability of national
governments to act independently, and that a process of homogenization
among countries will eventually lead to a so-called race to the bottom.

II. REVIEW OF THE

DEBATE

In comparative political economy, countless studies have been undertaken
over the past fifteen years - indeed it was one of the academic growth
industries of the 1990s - testing the convergence hypothesis; examining
how aspects of the welfare state, such as unemployment insurance, old-age
pensions, and public healthcare systems, have stood up; and attempting to

I For a review of the arguments in support of the race to the bottom see Daniel W.
Drezner, Globalization and Policy Convergence, 3 INT'L STUD. REV. 53 (2001).
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explain the trajectories in different countries. Contrary to the predictions of
the exponents of convergence, in the late 1980s and 1990s some researchers
found that while there were shifts in social policies, the basic institutions of
the welfare state appeared to remain intact. This, in turn, led to a spate of
literature attempting to explain welfare state persistence and retrenchment
in the face of globalization and other forces for convergence. The broad
theories that became prominent in this literature emphasized the importance
in individual countries of prevailing ideas, domestic interest groups, unique
political institutions and inertia.2
This debate over the effects of globalization on state sovereignty has been
taken up in several strands of the tax literature, most notably in the literature on
tax competition and harmonization. Those who expound the convergence thesis
in this context argue that as a result of increased tax competition, governments
will be pressured to reduce taxes generally; personal tax rates will be flattened
so as not to encourage the emigration of high-income individuals; taxes on
capital income will be reduced as countries compete for corporate investments
and as the increased mobility of capital makes enforcement of capital taxes
difficult or impossible; and there will be a shift to immobile and more regressive
tax bases such as consumption, payrolls and real property.
This debate has been joined at two levels. At one level, there is a debate
over whether tax competition has in fact reduced the ability of governments
to fund the welfare state. A frequently cited article making the case that it
has is Reuven Avi-Yonah's Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal
Crises of the Welfare State, published in 2000 in the HarvardLaw Review. 3
Others, particularly a number of political scientists studying comparative tax
political economy, have argued that countries still do have a good deal of
freedom in setting their tax structures; they point to the facts that generally
tax levels have not declined, corporate tax revenues have remained high, and
there is no clear indication of a shift from taxing mobile to immobile factors.
They conclude that there is no significant pressure on taxes and states are still
free to pursue their desired redistributive and other social policies.' At another

2

3
4

See generally Layna Mosley, Globalizationand the State: Still Room to Move?, 10
NEW POL. EcoN. 355 (2005).
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crises of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000).
Geoffrey Garrett & Debora Mitchell, Globalization, Government Spending and
Taxation in the OECD, 39 EUR. J. POL. RES. 145 (2001); DUANE SWANK, GLOBAL
CAPITAL, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, AND POLICY CHANGE IN DEVELOPED WELFARE

(2002); Duane Swank & Sven Steinmo, The New Political Economy of
Taxation in Advanced CapitalistDemocracies, 46 AM. J. POL. SCi. 642 (2002).
STATES
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level, the debate over tax competition has been joined by those who think it
promotes - indeed it is essential to - government efficiency and those who
regard it as an obstacle to democratic governance.'
In this Article, we deal principally with issues relating to the first level
of this debate. In particular, as a contribution to this debate, we survey
the evidence regarding changing tax levels and tax structures in the major
Western industrialized countries over the past thirty years. We conclude
that countries still do have some freedom in determining the level of taxes
they can impose and, therefore, the level of public services that they wish
to provide, but that globalization has had significant, but subtle, effects on
tax levels and structures. Consequently, it would appear that if countries
wish to retain their ability to use their tax systems to finance expanding
government services, redistribute income and constrain corporate power,
they will have to engage in a considerable amount of cooperation and agree
to some harmonization of tax structures.

III. METHODOLOGY
In examining the effects of globalization on tax levels and structures,
we compare nineteen high-income, large industrialized countries of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Reliable
comparisons are relatively easy for these countries since the OECD collects
comparable tax data from its member countries, and has done so for all years
since 1965. Also, since these countries are relatively affluent, stable democracies
they share a wide range of social, economic and political institutions. Thus,
by comparing only these OECD countries, some general variables can be held
constant such as a fundamentally capitalist and advanced industrial economy,
and a broadly defined Western cultural heritage.
The OECD is comprised of thirty countries; however, a number of them
that were admitted in recent years are less industrialized than others. In
order to include only countries at a similar stage of economic development,
countries with less than $25,000 GDP per capita in USD PPP in 2007 were
excluded. That eliminated the Czech Republic (joined in 1995), Hungary
(1996), Korea (1996), Mexico (1994), Poland (1996), the Slovak Republic
(1995), and Turkey (1961).

5

Compare CHRIS EDWARDS & DANIEL J. MITCHELL, GLOBAL TAX REVOLUTION: THE
RISE OF TAX COMPETITION AND THE BATTLE TO DEFEND IT (2008) i4th Diane Ring,

What's at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate? InternationalTax and the Nation-State,
49 VA. J. INT'L L. 156 (2008).
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Although the countries compared are similar in terms of their institutions,
they differ widely in size. Two OECD countries, Iceland and Luxembourg,
were excluded since, although they are relatively wealthy countries, they are
essentially small cities with populations of only about 300,000 and 500,000,
respectively. Japan and Switzerland were also excluded as they were found
not to fit easily into any of the welfare state groupings that we use in the time
period examined, even though their outlier status has diminished somewhat
in recent years.'
Still, the remaining countries range in size from the U.S. - with a
population of over 300 million - to Ireland, New Zealand, Norway,
Denmark and Finland - each with a population of less than or only slightly
more than 5 million. Although they differ widely in size, we made no effort
to weight the tax structures of the countries by reference to their population
or the size of their economies since the point of the comparisons is to derive
conclusions about the effect of globalizing economic forces on national
government policies.
Although the nineteen countries we examine share a number of features,
they obviously differ in important respects. In the field of comparative
political economy, a mini-discipline has developed attempting to categorize
countries according to their primary ideological inspiration, dominant forms
of social organization, central institutions, focus of their programs, aggregate
welfare spending, institutionalization of social rights, and/or aspects of their
economic and corporate governance and financial systems. During the 1990s,
when the role of the welfare state underwent a thorough reevaluation, work on
the resilience of different welfare regimes gained considerable prominence.
The point of departure was provided by Gosta Esping-Andersen's The Three
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism in 1990.
Esping-Andersen classified nations largely based upon his so-called
decommodification index, which measures the extent to which the welfare
of individuals in particular countries is reliant on the market, particularly in
terms of the availability and generosity of public pensions, unemployment
benefits and sickness insurance. He found that the groupings of countries
were similar when he examined the role of the welfare state in maintaining
or breaking down social stratification and the relative roles of the state,
the family, the voluntary sector, and the market in welfare provision.

6

Francis G. Castles & Herbert Obinger, Worlds, Families,Regimes: Country Clusters
in European and OECD Area Public Policy, 31 W. EUR. POL. 321, 321-44 (2008).

7

GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM (1990);
GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF POSTINDUSTRIAL

see also

ECONOMIES (1999).
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Based on this analysis, he classified advanced capitalist societies into three
types: social democratic (largely the Nordic countries), liberal (largely
the Anglo-American countries), and conservative (largely Germany and
other Continental European countries). A number of authors subsequently
identified an additional distinct regime, namely the Mediterranean model
(Portugal, Spain, Greece and to a limited extent Italy).' A vigorous debate
has taken place over the number and the alternative regime types into which it
is helpful to categorize modern welfare states,9 indeed some have questioned
the value of the exercise at all;'o nevertheless, the features of modern welfare
states captured in the four widely accepted categories of welfare regimes
have proved robust within much of the comparative social policy literature.
It is reasonable to suppose that the same variables that influence the structure
of a country's welfare system also influence the structure of its tax system.
Therefore, in the comparison of tax ratios and structures we will frequently
group countries into these widely used contrasting regimes.

IV.

TAX LEVELS

The most salient feature of a country's tax system is how much revenue it
collects. The usual way of comparing how much taxes are collected across
countries is to express the taxes collected in a country as a percentage of
the size of the economy, the country's gross domestic product (GDP). Table
1 provides this ratio for each OECD-19 country for five-year intervals from
1965 to 2000 and for a six-year interval from 2000 to 2006 (the last year
for which official data rather than provisional estimates for all nineteen

8

There is a lively debate in the literature as to whether these Mediterranean countries
are rudimentary welfare states that are moving towards their more developed Northern
states or in fact represent an entirely separate social contract. See Maurizio Ferrera,

The 'Southern Model' of Welfare in Social Europe, 6 J. EUR. Soc. POL'Y 17 (1996);
Stephan Leibfried, Towards a EuropeanWelfare State?, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE
WELFARE STATE IN EUROPE 133 (Catherine Jones ed., 1993).
9 See FAMILIES OF NATIONS (Francis Geoffrey Castles ed., 1993); Wil Arts & John
Gelissen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalismor More? A State-of-the-Art Report,
12 J. EUR. Soc. POL'Y 137 (2002); Colin Crouch, Models of Capitalism, 10
NEW POL. ECON. 439 (2005); Clare Bambra, Decommodification and the Worlds
of Welfare Revisited, 16 J. EUR. Soc. POL'Y 73 (2006); Lyle Scruggs & James
Allan, Welfare-State Decommodification in 18 OECD Countries:A Replication and
Revision, 16 J. EUR. Soc. POL'Y 55 (2006); Carsten Jensen, Worlds of Welfare
Services and Transfers, 18 J. EUR. Soc. POL'Y 151 (2008).
10 Gregory J. Kasza, The Illusion of Welfare 'Regimes,' 31 J. Soc. POL'Y 271 (2002).

Tax Levels, Structures, and Reforms

2010]

797

countries are available from the OECD Revenue Statistics database). The
ratio is expressed as an average over multi-year periods since the tax
collected in a country as a percentage of GDP in any one year is invariably
affected by that part of the business cycle the country is experiencing and
other macroeconomic variables.
Aside from its rising trend, what is perhaps most striking about the tax
ratio is how widely it varies from country to country. In the six years from
2000 through 2006, the U.S. collected the least amount of taxes among the
OECD-19, averaging 27.5 percent of GDP. That is in sharp contrast to the
average total tax revenue of 49.3 percent of GDP collected by Sweden,
which tops the industrialized countries in tax collection in the period. As a
percentage of the size of its economy, Sweden collects almost twice as much
in taxes as the U.S. The U.S. is also the only country among the nineteen
countries with average total tax revenue of less than 30 percent of GDP.
Ten of the countries collected average total tax revenue of more than 30
percent of GDP but less than 40 percent in the period, while the remaining
eight collected average total tax revenue of 40 percent of GDP or more.
On average, the four countries with the highest levels collected over 50
percent more taxes as a percentage of their GDP than the four lowest-taxed
countries in 2000-06.
This wide variation among countries of approximately equal economic
development would seem to suggest that countries have a good deal of
freedom in determining how they will pursue their national goals. At least
up until recent years, countries have functioned with very different tax levels.
This large variation in the tax/GDP ratio among industrialized countries also
calls into question the straightforward neoclassical economic version of
the limits to taxation. From time to time, economists have warned that
the marginal deadweight costs of the redistributive state rise nonlinearly
and have cautioned that governments could only collect 25 percent (or
some relatively low figure) of taxes as a percentage of GDP without doing
irreparable economic damage to their national economies." It seems unlikely
that the highest-taxed countries have discovered a formula for raising taxes
that allows them to do so without bearing the huge marginal costs that are
often predicted to result from raising taxes in the lower-taxed countries. 12

11 VITO TANZI & LUDGER SCHUKNECHT, PUBLIC SPENDING IN THE 20TH CENTURY: A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 54 (2001).
12 For empirical evidence that high-tax countries appeared to have achieved better
social policy outcomes without suffering irreparable economic harm, see NEIL
BROOKS

&

TAXATION:

THADDEUS HWONG, THE SOCIAL BENEFITS AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF

A COMPARISON

OF HIGH- AND Low-TAX COUNTRIES

(2006), available at
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Table 1: Rising Tax Ratios of OECD-19"
Average Total Tax Revenue as % of GDP
Group

Country

1965-69

1970-74

1975-79

1980-84

1985-89

1990-94

Nordic

Sweden
Denmark
Finland
Norway

37.2
32.0
31.7
32.3

39.1
40.6
33.3
37.7

45.6
40.2
37.8
40.6

47.0
43.2
36.9
42.5

50.4
48.2
40.9
42.5

48.3
47.0
45.0
40.5

50.0
49.3
46.2
41.7

49.3
48.9
44.5
43.1

Average

33.3

37.7

41.0

42.4

45.5

45.2

46.8

46.4

2.6

3.2

3.3

4.1

4.5

3.4

3.8

3.1

Belgium
France
Austria
Netherlands
Germany

33.6
34.2
34.5
34.6
32.4

35.3
33.9
34.9
38.0
33.4

41.2
37.1
37.5
41.5
35.9

42.7
41.2
39.4
42.8
35.8

43.6
42.4
40.4
43.9
36.1

42.6
42.3
40.9
44.2
36.4

44.5
44.2
43.0
40.5
36.7

44.8
43.8
43.0
38.2
35.6

Average

Standard
Deviation

Continental
European

1995-99 2000-06

33.9

35.1

38.6

40.4

41.3

41.3

41.8

41.1

Standard
Deviation

0.8

1.6

2.3

2.6

2.9

2.6

2.9

3.5

Italy
Spain
Portugal
Mediterranean Greece

26.1
15.6
16.8
19.6

25.5
16.8
18.0
19.3

26.3
20.1
21.0
21.1

32.5
24.6
24.8
23.7

35.4
30.2
26.2
25.6

39.8
32.9
29.3
27.0

41.9
32.9
32.7
32.0

41.6
34.8
34.5
32.3

19.5

19.9

22.1

26.4

29.3

32.3

34.9

35.8

Average
Standard
Deviation

AngloAmerican

4.7

3.9

2.8

4.1

4.5

5.6

4.7

4.0

U.K.
New Zealand
Canada
Australia
Ireland
U.S.

33.0
24.6
27.9
20.8
27.2
25.8

34.3
27.0
31.0
22.7
28.7
25.9

34.0
30.2
30.9
25.7
29.6
25.7

37.1
31.2
32.5
27.1
33.5
26.0

37.1
34.2
33.7
28.7
35.2
26.1

34.2
36.3
35.8
27.4
34.0
27.2

35.2
34.6
36.3
29.6
31.9
28.7

36.1
34.9
34.0
30.6
30.1
27.5

Average

26.5

28.3

29.4

31.2

32.5

32.5

32.7

32.2

4.0

4.1

3.2

4.1

4.2

4.1

3.1

3.3

28.4

30.3

32.7

35.0

36.9

37.4

38.5

38.3

6.4

.3

.8

7.3

7.5

6.8

6.7

6.5

Standard
Deviation
Average
OECD-19
Standard
Deviation
Source: OECD.

http://www.policyalternatives.ca/documents/NationalOfficePubs/2006/Benefits
and Costs of Taxation. pdf.
13 Data from OECD's Revenue Statistics dataset associated with the 2008 edition of
Revenue Statistics. See OECD, REVENUE STATISTICS 1965-2007 (2008). Averages
of countries were calculated for five-year panels, and the averages were used to
calculate country-group averages. Standard deviations were also calculated.
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The table also reveals that although tax levels reflect only one
characteristic used by political economists to classify welfare-state regimes,
in fact tax levels are a fairly accurate predictor as to which welfare state
regime a country belongs. In 2000-06, all the OECD-19 countries except
three have average tax/GDP ratios within four percentage points of their
respective country group average, and all except one have average tax/GDP
ratios within five percentage points of their respective country group average.
No country group has a majority of countries with tax/GDP ratios three
points or more higher or lower than the group average.
The four Nordic countries have an average tax/GDP ratio of 46.4 percent.
The average tax/GDP ratio from 2000-06 in the Continental European countries
was 41.1 percent, five percentage points below the Nordic countries. We have
classified Italy as a Mediterranean country; however, its tax ratio is equal to
the Continental European average. There is some dispute among welfare state
analysts as to whether Italy should be classified along with the Continental
European countries instead of with the Mediterranean countries.
The average tax/GDP ratio from 2000-06 in the Mediterranean countries
was 35.8 percent, over five percentage points below the Continental
European countries. Finally, the Anglo-American countries have an average
tax ratio over this period of only 32.2 percent.
Confirming the explanatory power of this classification scheme, the
between-regime differences in tax levels are notably larger than the
within-regime differences involving individual countries. Using the average
tax/GDP ratio from 2000-06, the standard deviation of the ratio for
all countries is 6.5 percentage points, in comparison to within-regime
differences for Nordic, Continental European, Mediterranean, and AngloAmerican of 3.1, 3.5, 4.0, and 3.3 percentage points, respectively. Withinregime differences are thus much smaller than between-regime differences.
In terms of the trend in tax levels, the tax ratio in the average OECD-19
country increased from 28.4 percent in 1965-69 to 38.3 percent in 2000-06,
an increase of 35 percent or 10 percentage points. Most of the increase took
place in the first half of that period, between 1965-69 and 1985-89 (8.5
percentage points). Nevertheless, the fact that this five-year average tax ratio
for the average OECD- 19 country has increased from 36.9 percent in 1985-89
to 38.3 percent in 2000-06 has been taken to suggest that globalization has
not affected the ability of welfare states to finance government spending
programs. However, a number of considerations suggest this conclusion is
somewhat misleading.
First, the increase over this last twenty-year period is only 1.4 percentage
points, and indeed in the last period (2000-06) the ratio declined by 0.2
percentage point. Second, a good part of the increase in the average is
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due to the growth in tax levels in the Mediterranean countries, where the
ratio increased from 29.3 percent to 35.8 percent (6.5 percentage points)
during this period. The Mediterranean states started the period at a relatively
low level and were clearly simply converging with the rest of Europe.
Third, the ratio in the average Anglo-American and Continental European
country declined slightly over the past twenty years. Fourth, in terms of the
convergence of tax ratios, as Table I reveals, the variation of the average tax
ratios of the OECD-19 in 2000-06 is little changed from that in 1965-69. The
standard deviation of the average tax ratios increased from the mid-1960s
until the mid-1980s, hinting at a divergence until that point. However,
the standard deviation has decreased since the late 1980s, hinting at the
possibility of convergence.14
Although there has been little convergence of tax levels, the fact that the
average tax ratio has increased only very slightly over these past twenty
years and in the most recent years has declined slightly is likely an indication
that countries are constrained by the pressures of globalization. A number
of economic, social and political developments over this period should
have resulted in expanded welfare state efforts. That is to say, without the
constraints imposed by globalization, one would have expected the tax ratio
in most industrialized countries to continue to increase.
First, demographic changes, such as changing family status (resulting in
fewer individuals being available to perform unpaid care-giving work) and an
aging population, should have resulted in greater demands for public services.
Second, related to these two demographic changes that would seem to have
required greater government-provided services over the past thirty years, the
need for increased taxes might also have been expected to become more acute
in many countries because of the recognition that greater government services
for care-giving work and public services that facilitate a work-family balance
are a precondition for functional gender equality. Third, another trend that
should have resulted in the need for greater government expenditures over
the past thirty years is that in most industrialized countries unemployment
was higher over this period than in previous decades. Fourth, over the past
thirty years there has also been a sharp rise in inequality, particularly in some
Anglo-American countries. One would expect that as inequality increases there
would be an increased need to make more use ofthe tax system to achieve a more
socially acceptable post-tax distribution of income. Moreover, as a political

14 The changes in the variation of tax ratios could just be chance occurrences. There is
no statistically significant difference between the standard deviation of one period
and that of the prior period.
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matter, increased inequality should be expected to increase political pressure
for redistribution as the number of voters below the mean increases. Fifth,
somewhat paradoxically, globalization itself increases the need for taxation
because it increases the instability of economies and the economic insecurity
of workers; this in turn should lead to an increased demand for social insurance
schemes. A sixth reason why government expenditures (and therefore taxes)
might have been expected to constitute an increasing share of GDP over the past
thirty years is that GDP per capita has been growing. As people get wealthier,
there is no reason to suppose they will continue to spend the same percentage
of their income on all goods and services. As people become better off, one
would expect them to spend relatively more on those goods and services that
they value most such as education, healthcare and insurance against economic
insecurity. One might also expect that as people become wealthier, they would
devote more of their wealth to assisting those less fortunate than themselves.
Thus, since most of these services are provided through government in many
countries, increased wealth should result in greater government services and
taxes in those countries in which these services are provided primarily through
government. Finally, one might have expected taxes to continue increasing over
the past thirty years because so many of the services that are purchased through
the public sector are heavily labor-intensive, such as defense, law and order,
and social, healthcare and educational services. Jobs in these sectors do not
experience substantial labor productivity gains. By contrast, in manufacturing
and technological jobs there have been astounding productivity gains. Yet,
even though there has been little growth in the productivity of the provisions
of personal services, generally personal service providers, such as teachers and
nurses, must continue to be paid the same relative salaries as paid workers in
manufacturing. Therefore, the cost of these services, relative to other goods
and services, must continue to increase. Consequently, as personal services
continue to become relatively more expensive, citizens must be prepared to
spend relatively more each year on government services - taxes have to
slowly rise each year - simply to maintain the same level of services. This
phenomenon of the increasing relative cost of services in which there is a lack
of growth of productivity is frequently referred to as Baumol's cost disease,
according to William Baumol's major contribution to its development in his
1967 article Macroeconomics of UnbalancedGrowth."

15 William Baumol, Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Groiwth: The Anatomy of Urban
Crisis, 57 AM. EcON. REV. 415 (1967). A recent overview can be found in a paper
revisiting the model in the context of health expenditures. See Jochen Hartwig,
What Drives Health Care Expenditure?- Baumol s Model of 'UnbalancedGrowth'
Revisited, 27 J. HEALTH EcON. 603, 605-07 (2008).
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This somewhat cryptic list of factors that might have been expected to
put upward pressure on government spending over the past thirty years,
and hence to have led to increased tax levels, does not of course prove
conclusively that globalization has constrained the ability of governments
to tax. Nevertheless, it surely raises that possibility.

V. CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION"
One of the most dramatic changes in tax structures over the past twenty-five
years has been the drop of the statutory corporate tax rate. The average
statutory corporate tax rate of the OECD-19 countries has fallen from an
average of around 50 percent in 1981 to an average of less than 30 percent
in 2008, a decline of over 40 percent. As Figure 1 shows, the rate declined
sharply in the late 1980s, remained steady in the mid-1990s, slipped again
in the late 1990s, and has continued falling over the past eight years. The
downward trend shows no signs of abating. Except Norway, all OECD- 19
countries have cut their corporate tax rates since 2001. For example, Canada
announced in 2007 a series of rate cuts that will reduce the federal corporate
tax rate from about 22 percent in that year to 15 percent in 2015. These cuts
will bring the combined federal- provincial corporate rate down from about
36 percent in 2007 to 25 percent in 2015.17 Germany also cut the overall
tax rate for corporations from about 39 percent to 30 percent in 2007.18 Italy
dropped its rate from 33 to 27.519 and the UK reduced its rate from 30 to 28

16 The trends in the corporate tax have been widely explored in both the political science
and economics literature. See generally Joel Slemrod, Are Corporate Tax Rates, or
Countries,Converging?,88 J. PUB. ECON. 1169 (2004); Michael P. Devereux, Business
Taxation in a Globalized World, 24 OXFORD REV. EcoN. POL'Y 625 (2008); Alan
Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux & Helen Simpson, Taxing Corporate Income (Ctr. for
Bus. Taxation, Working Paper No. 07/05, 2007); Simon Loretz, CorporateTaxation in
the OECD in a Wider Context, 24 OXFORD REV. EcON. POL'Y 639 (2008).
17

Gov'T OF CANADA, DEP'T OF FIN., BUDGET 2008 ch. 3 (2008), available at http:/
www.budget.gc.ca/2008/plan/chap3b-eng.asp; Gov'T OF CANADA, DEP'T OF FIN.,

BUDGET 2009 annex 2 (2009), availableat http://www.budget.gc.ca/2009/plan/bpa2eng.asp#2.
18 Wolfgang Kessler & Rolf Eicke, Germany's Corporate Tax Reform - The Road
Not Taken, 46 TAX NOTES INT'L 1107, 1135 (2007).
19 Herman P. Ayayo, Senate Approves 2008 Finance Bill, 49 TAX NOTES INT'L 40
(2008).
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in 2008.20 Sweden cut its corporate tax rate from 28 percent to 26.3 percent,
effective January 2009.21
Changes in the corporate statutory rate do not necessarily lead to changes
in the amount of corporate taxes paid, as the tax base might be broadened at
the same time the rates are being reduced. Two measures that take account of
both changes in the statutory rate and changes in the tax base (for example,
changes in the rate of depreciation allowed for capital assets, in investment tax
credits, in permissible inventory accounting methods, or in withholding taxes
on cross-border flows) are frequently used in assessing the effective corporate
taxes paid on new investments: the marginal effective tax rate (METR) and
the average effective tax rate (AETR). The METR is the proportion of the
rate of return on a marginal investment (an investment that breaks even) paid
in taxes, taking into account of the statutory tax rate and the major features of
the corporate tax base. Hence, it is the rate that a corporation considers when
deciding whether to make a new investment. The AETR is the actual tax paid
by a corporation divided by some measure of its pretax accounting income.
It is the rate of tax a corporation considers when deciding where to locate
a new investment. Figure 1 compares the decline in statutory rates across
the OECD-19 countries with the declines in these two effective rates. The
effective rates have declined less sharply than the statutory rate, indicating
that base-broadening measures have made up for some, but certainly not all,
of the loss of revenue due to declining statutory rates.
A key question in comparative tax law is what explains this trend of falling
statutory corporate tax rates? Is it due to a change in the prevailing ideas
about the ideal design of a corporate income tax? Does it reflect the spread
of neo-liberal ideology? Have those interests that would gain from reduced
rates increased their political power, or have changes in the socioeconomic
environment, in particular the pressures created by globalization, dictated
the changes? Of course, the trend could be (and likely is) due in part to
changes in all of these variables.

20
21

Bill Dodwell, Debbie Griffiths & Christopher Maton, UK Budget Delivers Relief
for Some, Painfor Others, 49 TAx NOTES INT'L 907 (2008).
Randall Jackson, Sweden Announces Corporate,Individual Tax Cuts, 51 TAX NOTES
INT'L

984 (2008).
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Figure 1: Falling Corporate Tax Rates22
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Although a slight downward trend in statutory corporate tax rates appears
to have started a few years earlier, the major turning point was undoubtedly
the U.S. 1986 Tax Reform Act. Those reforms cut the U.S. tax rate
from 46 to 34 percent. This reduced rate was more than compensated by
base-broadening measures, and corporate tax revenues actually increased
and indeed compensated for some of the revenue losses due to the
reduced rates in the personal income tax. Although there are a number
of possible explanations for the U.S. change, it undoubtedly reflected, in
large part, a fundamental change in ideas about the appropriate design of the
corporate tax. Over the previous thirty years, high corporate tax rates were
combined with a broad array of corporate tax incentives designed to steer
corporate investments into government-favored activities. Following a series
of economic studies, corporate tax incentives were widely seen as being
ineffective, leading to the misallocation of resources, causing unfairness,
and complicating the tax system.23 This resulted in pressure to reduce the

22

Time-series data from Institute of Fiscal Studies dataset. See Alexander

Klemm, Inst. for Fiscal Studies, Corporate Tax Rate Data (Jan. 2005),
http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/3210.
23 Duane Swank & Sven Steinmo, The New PoliticalEconomy of Taxation in Advanced
Capitalist Democracies, 46 AM. J. POL. Sci. 642 (2002); Sven Steinmo, The
Evolution of Policy Ideas: Tax Policy in the 20th Century, 5 BRIT. J. POL. & INT'L
REL. 206 (2003).

2010]

Tax Levels, Structures, and Reforms

805

corporate tax rate and broaden the tax base. Along with other political factors,
this pressure coalesced in the U.S. to produce the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
Legislators in other countries were undoubtedly influenced by the same
ideas that persuaded those in the U.S. Congress that a broad corporate tax base
and low rates represented sensible tax policy; however, once the U.S. reduced
its corporate tax rates, its major trading partners had little choice but to reduce
their rates as well because it was such a dominant capital-exporting country
at that time. The reason for this is that U.S. multinationals receive a foreign
tax credit for income taxes paid in foreign countries when they repatriate their
foreign earnings, but only up to the tax that would be paid on that income if it
had been earned in the U.S. Thus, if the foreign tax rates were higher than the
U.S. rates, U.S. multinationals would not receive a full credit in the U.S. for
those taxes. Hence, Canada and other countries almost immediately followed
the U.S. reforms and reduced their corporate tax rates. 24
Although the U.S. changes might have started the trend of falling statutory
corporate rates, countries soon began reducing their rates far below the
prevailing U.S. rate. There are two well-known reasons why countries have
to be concerned about the corporate tax rates imposed by other countries and
compete with them in reducing their rates. First, by changing their financial
structures (for instance, by locating debt and interest expenses in high-tax
countries) and by manipulating the prices charged for goods and services
transferred between related entities, multinationals have a good deal of
discretion as to in which of the countries where they carry on business they
report their worldwide profits. Second, the tax rates in a country determine,
at least in part, where multinationals locate their plant and equipment. With
globalization, it is argued that both decisions became increasingly sensitive
to tax rates. 25 It is difficult to disentangle the effect of changing ideas about
the corporate tax, the rise of neo-liberalism, the increasing power of business
on statutory corporate tax rates, and the effect of tax competition due to the
changing socioeconomic forces of globalization on statutory corporate tax
rates; however, there is at least some evidence that tax competition is the
dominant explanation for the decline in statutory corporate tax rates.

24 See John Whalley, ForeignResponses to the US Tax Reforms, in Do TAXES MATTER?
THE IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 286 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1990);
Roger Gordon, Can Capital Taxes Survive in Open Economies?, 47 J. FIN. 1159

(1992).
25

For a recent meta-analysis of the studies, see Ruud De Mooij & Sjef Ederveen,
Corporate Tax Elasticities: A Reader ' Guide to Empirical Findings, 24 OXFORD
REv. EcoN. POL'Y 680 (2008).
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Table 2: Changes in Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rates, 1981-200826
Corporate Income Tax Rates

Nordic

Continential
European

Mediterranean

Anglo-American

(%)

Change in
Percentage Points

Country

1981

2008

1981-2008

Finland
Sweden
Norway
Denmark

61.5
57.8
50.8
40.0

26.0
28.0
28.0
25.0

-35.5
-29.8
-22.8
-15.0

Average

52.5

26.8

-25.8

Austria
Germany
Netherlands
France
Belgium

55.0
60.0
48.0
50.0
48.0

25.0
30.2
25.5
34.4
34.0

-30.0
-29.8
-22.5
-15.6
-14.0

Average

52.2

29.8

-22.4

Portugal
Greece
Italy
Spain

49.0
45.0
36.3
33.0

26.5
25.0
27.5
30.0

-22.5
-20.0
-8.8
-3.0

Average

40.8

27.3

-13.6

Ireland
U.K.
Canada
Australia
New Zealand
U.S.

50.0
52.0
51.8
46.0
45.0
49.7

12.5
28.0
33.5
30.0
30.0
39.3

-37.5
-24.0
-18.3
-16.0
-15.0
-10.4

49.1/48.9*

28.9/32.2*

-20.2/-16.7*

48.9

28.3

-21.2

Average
OECD-19
Average
Source: OECD. * Excluding Ireland.

First, as Table 2 indicates, the decline in corporate tax rates occurred
across all types of welfare-state regimes. Indeed, somewhat surprisingly, the
Nordic countries have had the sharpest decline. In 1981 the Nordic countries
had the highest average statutory corporate tax rate of 52.5 percent, but in
2008 they had the lowest of 26.8 percent, a rate cut of about 50 percent. If

26 Data and calculations based on OECD Tax Database. See OECD Tax Database,
Taxation of Corporation and Capital Income, http://www.oecd.org/document/60
/0,3343,en 2649 34533 1942460 1 1 1 1,00.html#cci (last visited May 16,
2009).
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Ireland is excluded (since it reduced its corporate tax rate to a notoriously
low 10 percent on manufacturing firms in 1981, before raising it to only
12.5 percent in 2003 for all corporate business income), the Anglo-American
countries had the highest average corporate tax rate of 32.2 percent in 2008.
Changes of the rates in countries within the two country groups are more
similar to each other than other groups. In the Nordic group, the range
of rate cuts is about 10 percentage points, while in the Anglo-American
group the range is about 14 percentage points if Ireland is excluded. The
Mediterranean and Continental European groups have wider ranges of rate
cuts of 19 and 16 percentage points, respectively. Thus, there is no evidence
supporting a linkage between the political leanings of welfare state groups
and corporate tax rates.
Second, countries have been reducing their corporate statutory rates in a
series of steps. A few countries will reduce their rates and then others will
leapfrog over them, reducing their rates slightly more. This series of steps,
and the fact that at any given time most countries have reduced their rates to
about the same level, suggest they are largely reacting to the changes made
by one another.
Third, on the assumption that the economic case for lower corporate tax
would be seen to apply as well to lower personal income tax rates, then
one might expect the tax rates on corporate income and personal income to
fall at the same time. As shown in Table 3, both the top statutory personal
rates and the corporate tax rates in the OECD-19 countries have fallen over
the last twenty-five years. The personal rate fell from almost 70 percent in
1980 to 47 percent in 2006, while the corporate rate fell from almost 50
percent to about 30 percent over the same period. However, while the top
personal income tax rate fell quite dramatically in the late 1980s - at about
the same time as the first fall in the corporate tax rate - after 1990 the top
personal rate fell only slightly, while the corporate tax rate continued to drop
dramatically. Since 2000 the personal rate has dropped only 4 percent, while
the corporate rate has fallen by 13 percent. The gap between personal and
corporate rates narrowed in the 1990s, but has widened again since 2000 and
returned closer to its pre-1990 level.27 Arguably this suggests that something
other than a general aversion to high tax rates was driving the reductions in
the corporate tax rate.
Fourth, if tax competition accounted for the reduction in the statutory
corporate tax rate, then one would expect the rate to drop faster in

27

Using his time-series data, Loretz made the point about a similar pattern in the gap
between personal and corporate rates. See Loretz, supra note 16, at 649.
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Table 3: Comparing Statutory Personal Tax Rate and Statutory
Corporate Tax Rate of OECD-19 2 8
Year

Personal Income Tax
Rate (%)

Corporate Income Tax
Rate (%)

Difference in Percentage
Points

1980
1985
1990
1995

68.8
65.8
53.7
50.8

48.6
49.5
41.6
37.0

20.2
16.3
12.1
13.8

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

49.1
48.5
48.2
47.8
47.5
46.8
47.0

35.1
33.5
32.8
32.2
31.8
30.7
30.4

14.0
15.0
15.4
15.6
15.8
16.2
16.6

Sources: OECD for all rates except personal income tax rates in 1980, 1990 and 1995 from Fraser
Institute.

small countries than in large countries since they are more vulnerable to
competitive forces. This appears to be the case. Ganghof finds a significant
correlation between country size, as measured by population, and the decline
in corporate tax rates. 29 The relationship has existed since the early 1990s. 30
Fifth, and related to country size, a country with a more open economy
should experience the pressures of globalization more than a country with a
less open economy. There is statistical evidence showing that countries with

28 Data from OECD Tax Database and Fraser Institute. For OECD data, see OECD
Tax Database, http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en 2649 34533 1942460
1 1 1 1,00.html (last visited May 16, 2009). For Fraser Institute data used,
see JAMES D. GWARTNEY & ROBERT LAWSON WITH WALTER PARK & CHARLES
SKIPTON, EcONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD 2001 ANNUAL REPORT ch. 5 (2001),

http://oldfraser.lexi.net/publications/books/efw 2001/ (Country Tables).
29 Steffen Ganghof, Globalization, Tax Reform Ideals and Social Policy Financing,5
GLOBAL Soc. POL'Y 77, 84-85 (2005).

30 Ganghof used 2003 data in his analysis. To affirm his findings, bivariate regressions
using natural log of population of one-year lag to explain statutory corporate income
tax rates of OECD-19 of each year in 1981-2005 were run. They show that 1993
is the turning point. Since 1993, R-squared has been 0.27 or higher, and population
has become statistically significant at the five-percent level. Prior to 1993, the
regressions do not find a statistically significant relationship between population and
statutory income tax rates.
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a larger sum of inflow and outflow of foreign direct investment tend to have
lower statutory corporate income tax rates.
Statutory rates continue to fall across the OECD-19 countries and, even
without further increases in the mobility of financial capital and plant and
equipment and further ease in manipulating accounting profits, there is no
reason to believe that an equilibrium level has been reached.
Paradoxically, although there have been dramatic reductions in the statutory
corporate tax rates and in average effective tax rates, in most countries there
has been no decline in the amount of revenue collected from corporate income
taxes, whether measured as a percentage of GDP or of the total tax collected.
Indeed, as Figure 2 indicates, corporate tax revenues have been increasing
both as a percentage of GDP and as a percentage of total tax revenue. This
has led some to suggest that the effect of tax competition on corporate taxes
has been exaggerated. However, there are a number of explanations for the
fact that corporate tax revenues have not declined even though corporate tax
competition has led to a decline in statutory corporate tax rates.
The most obvious explanation for the maintenance of corporate tax revenues
in the face of declining statutory rates is that the corporate tax base has been
expanded to make up for the lost revenue. To some extent that is the case,
but it does not account for even most of the additional collected revenues.
As Figure 1 shows, effective tax rates, which account for rate reductions and
base-broadening, have been declining, although not at as fast as the statutory
rate - thus some base-broadening has obviously taken place. There are other
explanations for the recent robustness of corporate tax revenues; however, that
does not bode so well for the long-term viability of the tax.
One important reason why corporate tax revenues have increased even
though rates have been reduced is that corporate tax profits as a share of GDP
have increased greatly over the past twenty or so years. In many countries,
in fact, corporate profits as a percentage of GDP had reached historically
unprecedented levels just before the worldwide economic meltdown. In
part, this higher profit share, and thus higher corporate tax revenues, has
been attributed to the liberalizing forces of globalization.32 Also, Devereux

31

Regressing the natural log of total foreign direct investment with a one-year lag as an
independent variable against statutory corporate tax rates as the dependent variable
in 1991-2005 shows that the coefficient is negative and statistically significant at
a five-percent level. Data used in calculations were taken from OECD datasets.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) data were from OECD Factbook dataset. For
information, see, OECD, OECD FACTBOOK 2009: EcoNOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL
AND SOCIAL STATISTICS (2009). For corporate tax rates, see OECD Tax Database,

supra note 28.
32 Johannes Becker & Clemens Fuest, Internationalization and Business Tax Revenue
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et al. have suggested that another potential explanation for the growing share
of corporate profits in the economy is the rising share of the highly profitable
financial sector in the economy.3

Figure 2: Trends of Corporate Tax as Percent of GDP and Total Tax
Revenue, 1981-200534

Corpoat Tax Revenue as Percent of Totat Tax Revenue

4.
Corporate Tax Revenue as Percent of GDP

Sou e:

OELD

Another reason why corporate tax revenues have increased is that the
gap between the top personal marginal tax rate and the corporate tax rate
has widened, creating an increased incentive to shift income from the
personal to the corporate sector. This shift might be due to the increased
incorporation of business activity, the transfer of portfolio investments into
corporations, or the transformation of labor income into business income
earned in corporations by, for example, controlling shareholders simply
reducing salary withdrawals. Mooij and Nicodbme have recently estimated

- Evidence from Germany (July 12, 2007) (paper prepared for the ETPF meeting in
London, Apr. 23, 2007), availableat http://www.etpf.org/papers/24international.pdf.
33 Michael P. Devereux, Rachel Griffith & Alexander Klemm, Why Has the UK
Corporate Tax Raised So Much Revenue (Inst. Fiscal Stud., Working Paper No.
W04/04, 2004).

34 Time-series data from OECD's Revenue Statistics dataset. See OECD, supra note
13.
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that as high as over 20 percent of annual corporate tax revenue can be
explained by the shift in the tax base from relatively higher-taxed personal
income to lower-taxed corporate income.
Competition between countries over statutory corporate tax rates is
troubling in its own right since it limits the ability of governments to raise
revenue from the corporate sector, distorts the location of business plant and
equipment, and results in wasteful efforts to shift corporate profits to low-tax
countries. However, it has more subtle adverse effects on tax structures.
First, it results in the shifting of taxes from highly profitable multinational
corporations that earn economic rents to small and medium-sized, often
domestically owned businesses.36 Second, it shifts taxes from capital to
consumption and labor. Third, it undermines the progressivity of the personal
income tax when the corporate tax rate is reduced it places pressure on the top
personal marginal tax rate as individuals attempt to transform personal income
into corporate source income. Fourth, it results, in particular, in a substantial
decline in tax revenues for those countries that are unable to broaden their
corporate tax bases to recoup the revenue loss. This is particularly a problem
for low-income countries since they tend to rely heavier on the corporate tax
for general revenues than high-income countries, and since for a number of
reasons they often have difficulty broadening their corporate tax bases in order
to make up the revenue lost through rate reductions.3

VI. PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION

Like statutory corporate tax rates, personal statutory tax rates have declined
dramatically over the past thirty years or so. Following World War II, top
marginal rates soared in some countries, for example, to in excess of 90

35 Ruud de Mooij & Gaitan Nicodbme, How Corporate Tax Competition Reduces

Personal Tax Revenues, 2008 CESIFO DICE REPORT 27; Ruud De Mooij & Gaitan
Nicodeme, Corporate Tax Policy, and Incorporationin the EU, 15 INT'L TAX &
PUB. FIN. 478, 494-95 (2008).
36 Michael P. Devereux, Rachel Griffith, & Alexander Klemm, Corporate Income Tax
Reforms and InternationalTax Competition, 17 EcoN. POL'Y 451 (2002).
37 Michael Keen & Alejandro Simone, Is Tax Competition Harming Developing
Countries More Than Developed?, 34 TAX NOTES INT'L 1317 (2008) (on average,
corporate tax revenues made up 17 percent of total revenues in developing countries,
compared to only 7 percent in developed countries, and between 1990 to 2001
corporate tax revenues declined on average by about 20 percent in developing
countries due to rate reductions and their inability to make up the revenue through
base-broadening).
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percent in the U.S. During the 1950s and 1960s, the top rate in many
countries exceeded 80 percent. As late as 1980, as Table 3 shows, the
top rate in the average OECD-19 country was only slightly less than 70
percent; by 1990 it had declined to about 54 percent, and by 2000 to about
49 percent. As Table 4 shows, over the past seven years the top personal
rate dropped further, almost three percentage points, to 46.4 percent. It has
declined in each welfare state regime. In 2007, the Nordic countries had the
highest average top marginal personal tax rate of 51.7 percent, while the
Anglo-American countries had the lowest at 42.4 percent.
Again, like the decline in the statutory corporate tax rate, the decline in
the personal rate is likely due to a number of factors: changing ideas about
the tradeoff between equity and efficiency; the influence of neo-liberalism;
and attempts by countries to create a friendly labor market environment
for high-income individuals and to signal a business-friendly environment.
However, Ganghof and others have argued that, at least after the U.S. tax
reforms of 1986, the downward trend in the personal top income tax rate is
in part the result of a spillover effect caused by the reduction in the statutory
corporate tax rate (which in turn was due in large part to international
competitive pressures caused by globalization)." As the corporate tax rates
were reduced, countries felt obliged to reduce the top personal rate in order
to reduce the gap between the two rates. A large gap between the corporate
and personal tax rates provides a strong incentive for individuals to seek ways
of sheltering their personal income from the top personal rate by shifting into
corporate forms. Although anti-avoidance measures can prevent this shift to
some extent, most countries have felt the need to reduce the incentive for
such tax planning by keeping the gap within reasonable bounds. Ganghof
argues that this spillover effect has been mediated by domestic factors, such
as partisan ideology and veto points in the legislative process, leading to the
fairly large difference in the top rates between the Nordic and the AngloAmerican countries.3 9 Nevertheless, all welfare state regimes have felt the
need to respond to international tax competition.
In the average OECD- 19 country, revenues from the personal income tax
have fallen both as a percentage of GDP, from 11.4 percent in 1980-84 to
10.9 percent in 2000-06, and as a percentage of total tax revenues, from
31.9 percent in 1980-84 to 28.3 percent in 2000-06.

38

STEFFEN GANGHOF, THE POLITICS OF INCOME TAXATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

39

37-41 (2006) [hereinafter GANGHOF, POLITICS OF INCOME TAXATION]; Steffen
Ganghof & Philipp Genschel, Taxation and Democracy in the EU, 15 J. EUR.
PUB. POL'Y 145 (2008).
GANGHOF, POLITICS OF INCOME TAXATION, supra note 38, at 43-58.
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Table 4: Top Statutory Personal Income Tax Rate, 2000-0740
Top Statutory Personal Income Tax Rate (%)
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Denmark

59.7

59.7

54.4

59.7

59.7

59.7

59.7

59.7

Sweden

55.4

55.5

55.5

56.2

56.5

51.6

56.6

56.5

Finland

55.2

54.7

53.8

53.0

52.1

51.8

50.9

50.5

Norway

47.5

47.5

47.5

47.5

47.5

43.5

40.0

40.0

Average

54.4

54.4

52.8

54.1

54.0

51.7

51.8

51.7

Belgium

63.9

63.3

55.6

53.5

53.5

53.5

53.5

53.5

Netherlands

60.0

52.0

52.0

52.0

52.0

52.0

52.0

52.0

Continental

Austria

45.0

45.5

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

European

France

53.3

53.2

60.4

57.2

55.7

55.9

55.9

47.8

Germany

53.8

51.2

51.2

51.2

47.5

45.2

45.4

47.5

Average

55.2

53.0

53.8

52.8

51.7

51.3

51.3

50.1

Italy

46.4

45.9

46.1

46.1

46.1

44.1

44.6

44.9

Spain

48.0

48.0

48.0

45.0

45.0

45.0

45.0

43.0

Portugal

35.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

42.0

42.0

Greece

45.0

42.5

40.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

Average

43.6

44.1

43.5

42.8

42.8

42.3

42.9

42.5

Australia

48.5

48.5

48.5

48.5

48.5

48.5

48.5

46.5

Canada

46.4

46.4

46.4

46.4

46.4

46.4

46.4

46.4

U.S.

46.7

46.1

45.3

41.6

41.5

41.4

41.4

41.4

Anglo-

Ireland

44.0

42.0

42.0

42.0

42.0

42.0

42.0

41.0

American

I.K.

40.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

New Zealand

39.0

39.0

39.0

39.0

39.0

39.0

39.0

39.0

Average

44.1

43.7

43.5

42.9

42.9

42.9

42.9

42.4

Average

49.1

48.5

48.2

47.8

47.5

46.8

47.0

46.4

Nordic

Mediterranean

OECD-19

Source: OECD Tax Datahase.

40

Data from OECD Tax Database. For Personal income tax rates, see OECD Tax
Database, Personal Income Tax Rates, http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,
en 2649 34533 1942460 1 1 1_1,00.html#pir (last visited May 16, 2009).
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VII. CONSUMPTION TAXES
Another major trend in tax structures has been the increasing reliance on
consumption taxes. The spread of the value-added-tax (VAT) over the past
forty years is legendary and has spawned a literature on its own.41 But more
generally, as a percentage of GDP, general consumption taxes have gone from
5 to 7 percent in the average OECD-19 country from 1980-84 to 2000-06.
As a percentage of tax revenue, they have gone from 15 to 18.3 percent over
the same period. As Table 5 shows, both as a percentage of GDP and as a
percentage of total tax revenue, they have gone up in almost every welfare
state regime, except as a percentage of total tax revenue in the Continental
European group, which shows a slight slippage.
Table 5: General Consumption Tax TrendS42
General Consumption Taxes
1965-691970-741975-791980-841985-891990-941995-992000-06
OECD-19

4.1

4.7

5.0

5.4

6.2

6.5

6.8

7.0

Avenage Tax

Nordic

5.4

6.8

7.0

7.5

8.2

8.2

8.9

8.8

Revenue as

Continental
European
Mediterranean
Anglo-American

6.3
2.6
2.2

6.7
3.0
2.8

6.9
3.3
3.0

7.3
3.7
3.7

7.3
5.2
4.7

7.1
5.9
5.2

7.2
6.3
5.3

7.2
6.9
5.7

OECD-19

13.8

15.1

14.7

15.0

16.7

17.2

17.5

18.3

Average Tax

Nordic

16.4

18.1

17.2

17.7

18.2

18.3

19.1

19.0

Revenue as
% of Total
Tax
Revenue

Continental
European
Mediterranean
Anglo-American

18.7
13.7
8.3

19.1
15.1
9.7

18.0
15.0
10.1

18.1
13.9
11.5

17.7
18.2
13.9

17.2
18.9
15.4

17.3
18.6
15.9

17.7
19.7
17.3

% of GDP

Source: OECD Revenue Statistics.

41 For a discussion of some of this literature, see Kathryn James, An Examination
of Convergence and Resistance in Global Tax Reform Trends, 11 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 475 (2010).

42 Data from OECD Revenue Statistics dataset. For information on Revenue Statistics
see OECD, supra note 13.
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WE CARE ABOUT THESE TRENDS INTAX STRUCTURES?

These changes in tax structures - lower corporate statutory rates, lower
top rates on personal income, and a shift away from taxing income from
capital to taxing consumption - are generally applauded by those who
are concerned about the effect of taxes on economic efficiency, and they
usually attribute the shift in large part to the dictates of tax competition.
However, somewhat interestingly, even some commentators who generally
see a large role for the government in providing public goods and in
attempting to achieve a more socially acceptable distribution of income than
that which results from market forces are untroubled by this change in tax
structures. In recent years, a number of authors have advanced the view that
a regressive tax mix - high revenue shares of consumption and payroll
taxes coupled with low rates of tax on income from capital - has been
conducive to building and maintaining large welfare states. This argument
has been advanced most vigorously by Junko Kato in her book-length study
Regressive Taxation and the Welfare State43 and by Peter Lindert in his

efforts to explain why the welfare state looks like a "free lunch."44 Kato's
general claim is that "a revenue shift to regressive taxes makes it politically
easier to maintain a large public sector"45 and that in Europe "a mature welfare
state is closely connected to a large reliance on regressive taxation."46
Peter Lindert, an economic historian, suggests that the Nordic welfare
states enjoy a "free lunch" in the sense that they have delivered much
better social outcomes - such as less poverty and more equality - than
Anglo-American countries at essentially no cost in terms of GDP. 47 How
have they been able to maintain the high tax levels (about 50 percent of GDP)
needed to financetheir social insurance programs without imposing large costs
on their economies? One ofhis main conclusions as to why these welfare states
have not damaged economic growth is that "they have a more pro-growth and
regressive mix of taxes." In particular, "they do not have higher average rates

43

JUNKO KATO, REGRESSIVE TAXATION AND THE WELFARE STATE (2003).

44 Peter H. Lindert, Why the Welfare State Looks Like a Free Lunch (Nat'1 Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9869, 2003); PETER H. LINDERT, GROWING
PUBLIC:

SOCIAL SPENDING

AND

ECONOMIC

GROWTH

SINCE THE EIGHTEENTH

CENTURY (2004) [hereinafter LINDERT, GROWING PUBLIC].

45 KATO, supra note 43, at 51.
46 Id at 112.
47 LINDERT, GROWING PUBLIC, supra note 44, at 29 ("Conclusion #7: The net national

costs of social transfers, and of the taxes that finance them, are essentially zero. They

do not bring the GDP costs that much of Anglo-American literature has imagined.").
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of taxation on capital income." Instead, "they rely more heavily on labor
income taxes and on flat consumption (or value added) taxes."48 Figure 3
illustrates the familiar findings upon which these studies in part are based.
Those countries that have high public social expenditures also tend to have
tax systems that impose high implicit tax rates on labor and consumption and
relatively lesser tax rates on income from capital.
Figure 3: Public Social Expenditures v. Effective Tax Rates49

A70

RelatIonship between rates on labour and
consurmption and publc

sociai

expenditures

S50

45
S40
-

Relationship between rates on capital
a35
nd puhiC rc al expeind turec

15
11520

2530

35

Averge Puble Social Expenditures as Percent of GDP in 1980-5 1986 90 and 1991-97

48 Id. at 31. The author also notes that "[t]hey also tax addiction goods (e.g., alcohol and
tobacco) more heavily, thus taxing complements to health-compromising leisure."
He concludes that "their attention to the side-effects of economic growth seems to
have led them to choose types of taxes that minimise or eliminate any damage to
growth, relative to the types of taxes levied in lower-spending countries such as the
United States, Japan, or Switzerland." Id
49 For average tax rates, see David Carey & Harry Tchilinguirian, Average Effective Tax
Rates on Capital,Labor and Consumption (OECD Econ. Dep't, Working Paper No.
258, 2000). For information on OECD social expenditures dataset, see OECD,
Social Expenditure Database, http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3343,en_2649
34637 38141385 1 1 1 1,00.html (last visited May 16, 2009).
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There are a number of possible explanations for the curious fact that
countries with high public social expenditures tend to have lower effective
rates of tax on income from capital than on income from labor. First, it
could reflect an implicit or explicit political bargain struck between groups
representing capital and those representing labor and allied groups; the
former are prepared to endure high taxes and social transfers while, in return,
the latter are prepared to tolerate low taxes on capital.so Second, as suggested
by Peter Lindert above, the low rate of tax on capital might reflect a deliberate
policy judgment to reduce the taxation of investment in order to encourage
economic growth. Third, tax analysts who support consumption taxes have
offered a number of tax policy reasons why income from capital should be
taxed less than income from labor." For whatever reasons, these arguments
have perhaps had more force in the Nordic countries. Fourth, low rates of tax
on income from capital in these countries, which are mainly open economies,
might be a consequence of international tax competition. Regardless of the
political or policy preferences of the citizens of a country, low rates of tax on
capital might be perceived as necessary in order to attract capital and prevent
capital flight. Finally, for a host of political reasons, including their higher
visibility, taxes on capital might be more difficult to impose than taxes on
labor.
Moreover, in reply to those who argue that if too large a share of
tax revenues is in the form of regressive taxes the tax system cannot
be used as an effective instrument to redistribute income, a number of
commentators have pointed out that most countries achieve inequality
reduction primarily through the transfer side of their budgets.52 Ifthe amount
of fiscal redistribution is measured by focusing on the absolute change in the
Gini coefficient of inequality before and after government taxes and transfers,
across thirteen major industrialist countries on average about 25 percent of
the change is accounted for by taxes and 75 percent by transfers.53 Moreover,

50 See Sven Steinmo, Globalization and Taxation: Challenges to the Swedish Welfare
State, 35 COMP. POL. STUD. 839, 843 (2002) ("The postwar compromise in Sweden
can be represented as a 'deal' between labor, capital, and the Social Democratic
government in which . . . the Socialists and their labor union allies would conduct
wage strategies and tax policies would explicitly favor corporate capital.").
51 These arguments are critically reviewed in Neil Brooks, An Overview of the Role
of the VAL Fundamental Tax Reform and a Defence of the Income Tax, in GST IN
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 597 (Richard Krever & David White eds., 2007).
52 See, e.g., LANE KENWORTHY, JOBS WITH EQUALITY 173-98 (2008).
53 The countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the United States. See
Vincent A. Mahler & David K. Jesuit, Fiscal Redistribution in the Developed
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the proportion of the change due to transfers is generally higher in more
egalitarian countries. For example, in Sweden, where the total change in the
Gini coefficient due to fiscal redistribution was on average 0.218 in recent
years, taxes accounted for only about 18 percent of the fiscal redistribution;
whereas in the U.S., where the total change in the Gini coefficient due to
fiscal redistribution was only 0.102, taxes accounted for about 45 percent of
the change.54 Of course, in part, the U.S. tax system plays a larger relative
role in redistribution because transfers are so low in that country and do little
to redistribute income; nevertheless, the fact that transfers can be relatively
effective at reducing inequalities has led some commentators to suggest that
progressive taxes are not needed for achieving a more equal society.55
It is the case that if the only purpose of taxes were to finance redistributive
transfer payments the tax rate could be flat. However, if there is a case for
redistributing from the very rich, because they have no moral claim to their
vast incomes or because their economic power threatens democratic values
and the quality of life in a society, then transfer payments cannot, obviously,
be used for this purpose.
There is evidence to suggest that the Nordic dual income tax rates, in
which income from capital is taxed at a low flat rate, have resulted in
much greater inequality at the top end of the income scale. In Finland,
after years of declining inequality, beginning in the mid-1990s there was an
unprecedented surge in the share of income received by the top one percent.
Unlike Anglo-American countries, where the recent increase in inequality
was due largely to the large salaries received by high-income individuals,
in Finland over 50 percent of the income received by the top one percent
took the form of income from capital. Only 14 percent of their incomes
were capital income as late as 1990. The authors of a recent report on the
trends in top income shares in Finland conclude that "the decline in income
progressivity since the mid 1990s is a central factor explaining the increase
in top income shares in Finland."5 1 Somewhat similarly, in Sweden the top
incomes have increased dramatically over the past two decades, as in AngloSaxon countries but unlike Continental European countries, and much of this
increase is due to capital gains and other forms of income from capital.

Countries: New Insights from the Luxembourg Income Study, 4 Soclo-ECONOMIC
REv. 486, 490 tbl.1 (2006).
54

Id

55 KENWORTHY, supra note 52.
56 Marja Riiheli, Risto Sullstrdm & Matti Tuomala, Trends in Top Income Shares in
Finland (Gov't Inst. for Econ. Research Fin. (VATT), Discussion Paper No. 371,
2005), available at http://www.vatt.fi/file/vatt publication pdfk371.pdf.
57 Jesper Roine & Daniel Waldenstom, Top Incomes in Siveden over the lventieth
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Gustafsson and Jansson said that if the tax system prior to the tax reforms in
the early 1990s were in place in Sweden during the 1990s, top- income earners
would have had to pay considerably more capital gains tax."

IX.

NEUTRALIZING THE FORCES OF GLOBALIZATION

Based upon these trends in changing tax structures, if citizens are to retain
the ability to choose the goods and services they would like to provide
to themselves collectively through democratically elected institutions, and
to use the tax system to achieve a more socially acceptable distribution of
income, the forces of globalization that are in large part responsible for these
trends will have to be neutralized. The most obvious way for that to happen
is for countries to agree to coordinate and harmonize aspects of their tax
systems, particularly as they relate to the taxation of income from capital.
There is a huge debate in the tax literature over the relative merits of
tax competition 5 9 and tax harmonization.6 0 This is not the place to review the
merits of those arguments, but we would only note that if the interconnected
international forces that are constraining tax structures and making it difficult
if not impossible to tax income from capital are to be neutralized, it would
appear to require more of the types of coordination and harmonization that

Century (Stockholm Sch. of Econ., Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance,
Working Paper No. 602, 2005).
58 Bj6rn Gustafsson & Birgitta Jansson, Top Incomes in Sweden over Three-Quarters
ofa Century: A Micro Data Approach, 32 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 963, 970-71 (2008).
59 CHRIS EDWARDS & DANIEL L. MITCHELL, GLOBAL TAX REVOLUTION: THE RISE OF
TAX COMPETITION AND THE BATTLE TO DEFEND IT (2008); Julie Roin, Competition
and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 89 GEO. L.J.
543 (2001); Tsilly Dagan, Competing for Business, 36 INTERTAX 201 (2008); see
also Tsilly Dagan, The Costs ofInternationalTax Cooperation(Mich. Law & Econ.,

Research Paper No. 02-007, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3153733;
Tsilly Dagan, Just Harmonization, U. BRITISH COLUMBIA L. REV. (forthcoming
2010).
60 Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV.

259 (2003). On efforts for harmonization in the European Union, see generally
ADOLFO J. MARTIN JIMENEZ, TOWARDS CORPORATE TAX HARMONIZATION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS (1999);
CARLO PINTO, TAX COMPETITION AND EU LAW (2003); TAX COMPETITION INEUROPE
(Wolfgang Schon ed., 2003); INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN TAX LAW: DIRECT
TAXATION (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2008); MALCOLM GAMMIE ET AL., ACHIEVING
A COMMON CONSOLIDATED CORPORATE TAX BASE IN THE EU (2005); TOWARDS A
HOMOGENEOUS EC DIRECT TAX LAW (Ceclie Brokelind ed., 2007).
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have been suggested by commentators and in government forums over the
past decade, such as the following:
First, building on the OECD and EU initiatives to prevent harmful tax
competition, additional steps are required to challenge those countries that
seek to artificially attract passive investment income. 6'
Second, the OECD recently modified Articles 26 (Exchange of
Information) in its model income tax treaty, and its model Tax Information
Exchange Agreement (TIEA) to provide for the exchange of information in
civil as well as criminal tax matters, to not require suspicion of criminal
conduct before an exchange is required, and to override bank secrecy
provisions in domestic laws. However, the requirements for the exchange
of information from financial institutions must go much further, be put on
a multilateral basis, and require the comprehensive and automatic exchange
of all information relating to payments from financial institutions.62
Third, the United Nations Committee of Experts on International
Cooperation in Tax Matters should be upgraded from its current expert
status to intergovernmental status in order to recognize the important
political nature of its work, and a strengthened version of its code of
conduct for cooperation in combating international tax evasion should be
widely endorsed." Consideration might also be given to the UN establishing a
world tax organization that, among other things, would assist in coordinating
and harmonizing domestic tax systems with a view to ensuring that all income
from capital will be taxed at a reasonable rate.64
Fourth, the European Commission recently adopted a Communication,
Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters, in which it urged all member
states to take action, among other things, to ensure effective administrative
cooperation in the assessment of taxes and recovery of tax claims and to
improve the functioning of the Savings Tax Directive - which provides for
the multilateral, automatic exchange of information on interest from bank
accounts paid to individuals - by extending the scope of the Directive

61 See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report:
A Tenth Anniversary Retrospective, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 783 (2009).
62 Cynthia Blum, SharingBank DepositInformation with Other Countries: Should Tax
Compliance or Privacy Claims Prevail?,6 FLA. TAX REV. 579 (2005).
63 See Michael J. McIntyre, United Nations Code of Conduct on Cooperation in
Combating International Tax Evasion (Wayne State Univ. Law School, Research
Paper No. 08-12, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 1118805.
64 Frances M. Homer, Do We Need an InternationalTax Organization?,24 TAX NOTES
INT'L 179 (2001).
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to intermediate tax-exempt structures and to income equivalent to interest
obtained through investments in some innovative financial products."
Fifth, capital exporting countries should cooperate in strengthening the
taxation of the passive and other easily diverted income of controlled foreign
corporations (CFCs). 6 6
Sixth, countries should impose a refundable withholding tax on payments
to all countries that do not provide for automatic exchange of information."7
The right of countries to tax income from capital at source should be
reinforced.
Seventh and finally, for corporate tax, the adoption of unitary taxation
with formula apportionment coupled with agreement on an acceptable range
of corporate tax rates would appear to be essential. 8

65

Communicationfrom the Commission to the Council, the European Parliamentand
the European Economic and Social Committee: Promoting Good Governance in
Tax Matters, COM (2009) 201 final (Apr. 28, 2009), available at http://eur-lex.eur
opa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:020 I:FIN:EN:PDF.
66 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Competitionand MdltinationalCompetitiveness: The
New Balance of SubpartF, 18 TAX NOTES INT'L 1575 (1999).
67 Reuvan S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposalfor
Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1031 (1996).
68 Kimberly Clausing & Reuven Avi-Yonah, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a
Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment (The Hamilton

Project, Brookings Inst., Discussion Paper No. 2007-08, 2007), available at http://
www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/06corpsoratetaxes clausing.aspx.

